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Indian Perspectives on the Rise of China: 
Geopolitical, Geoeconomic, and Geocivilizational Paradigms 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang* 
One of the most significant developments in the still nascent 
twenty-first century is the rise of China and India. While the 
implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or 
systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, relatively 
sparse scholarly discussion has been devoted to either the rise of the 
other great power- India, or how these two Asian great powers- India 
and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these 
two very different Asian giants perceive each other and consequently 
negotiate their paths in substantially changed global and regional 
contexts will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This 
paper analyzes this complex relationship and examines how Indian 
elites - in political, security, and economic arenas -perceive the rise of 
China. Based on the authors field research in India and secondary 
sources, this paper examines this important yet complex relationship by 
three contrasting perspectives -- geopolitical, geoeconomic, and 
geocivilizational, and assesses the alternative prospects: "Chindia" 
(Indo-Chinese partnership), rivalry, or pragmatic management of 
bilateral relationship. 
• Vincent Wei-cheng Wang (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1995) is Associate Professor 
and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Richmond, Virginia, United 
States of America. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant developments in the still nascent 
twenty-first century is the rise of China and India. The econom1c 
takeoffs of the world's two most populous nations are occurnng 
simultaneously. China's and India's ascent entail far-reaching and 
complex geopolitical and geoeconomic implications. As one of the 
growing number books on this subject1 put it, "rarely has the economic 
ascent of two still relatively poor nations been watched with such a 
mixture of awe, opportunism, and trepidation" (Engardio 2007:16). 
While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the 
global or systemic contexts, 2 as well as regional or bilateral contexts, 3 
relatively sparse scholarly discussion has been devoted to either the rise 
of the other great power - India,4 or how these two Asian great powers -
India and China5 - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet as 
constructivists (Wendt 1989) would certainly agree, how these two very 
different Asian giants perceive each other and consequently negotiate 
their paths in substantially changed global and regional contexts will be 
important for scholarly interest and policy making. 
1 For example, Emmot (2008), Engardio (2007), Garver (2002), Khanna (2007), 
Meredith (2007), and Sidhu and Yuan (2003). 
2 See Brown et al (2000), Mearsheimer (200 1 ), Johnston (2008) 
3 See Kang (2007), Keller and Rawski (2007), Sutter (2005), Wang (2006), and Womack 
(2006). 
4 See Panagariya (2008) and Cohen (200 1 ). 
5 Meredith (2007) describes these two nations as "The Elephant and the Dragon." 
J 
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This paper analyzes this complex relationship and exammes how 
Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the 
rise of China. It also assesses the prospects of Indo-Chinese partnership 
("Chindia")(Engardio 2007) or rivalry in future bilateral relationship. 
Three perspectives -- geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational -
are used to study this important yet difficult relationship. 
LEMENTS OF A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 
History 
Although China and India were two adjoining civilizations, there was 
remarkably little historical evidence of direct political interaction between 
them (Sidhu and Yuan 2003:9). However, there was mutual intellectual 
fascination. Many Chinese scholars visited India in the first millennium 
to study Buddhism and other subjects, and many of them spent a decade 
or more in India. Chinese monks such as Faxian in the fifth century and 
Xuanzang in the seventh played important roles in introducing Buddhism 
to China and bridging the two cultures. Many Indian scholars also went 
to China and worked there between the first century and the eleventh (Sen 
2005: 161). 
However, religion was not the only relationship between the two. 
Trade was also important. Indian intermediaries facilitated trade 
between China and Western Asia for centuries (Sen 2005: 166). A 
branch of the famous Silk Road extended into the plains of northern India. 
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
But for the most part there was little interaction - mostly indirect -
between China and India before the arrival of western imperial powers. 
Colonialism afflicted both India and China and pitted the two 
civilizations against each other. During the Opium War (1839-1842), 
Britain tried to forcibly sell m China the opium from its East India 
Company. 
These two nations' shared colonial expenence contributed to 
empathy - a kind of Asian and anti-imperial pride -- between them. 
Both Nehru and Gandhi were friendly with the Nationalist Chinese leader 
Chiang Kai-shek.6 Chiang and his wife visited India in 1942 to appeal to 
Britain and coordinate wartime effort against Japan (Ghose 2006: 112). 
India gained independence from Britain in 194 7. When Mao Zedong 
established a communist regime in China in 1949, India was among the 
first to recognize the People's Republic of China on 1 April 1950. Nehru, 
typical of Indian leaders, personally invested in maintaining friendly ties 
with China and cultivating personal relationships with Chinese leaders, 
especially Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Nehru, who promoted the 
slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (India and China are brothers), reportedly 
said, "China was my most admired nation."7 An Indian security analyst 
6 In his letter to Chiang, Gandhi expressed his admiration for China's struggle against 
Japanese domination, and described their "mutual friend," Nehru, "whose love of China 
is only excelled, if at all, by his love of his own country" (Gandhi 1942, in Jack 1994: 
351). 
7 Speech by Prof. Tan Chung at National Taiwan University, Taipei, 20 May 2008. Tan 
and his father, Tan Yunshan, together spent 80 years in India. 
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said, "From the 1950s on, we have looked at China from an Asian 
solidarity standpoint - whether it was nuclear weapons (China's 1964 
explosion) or the United Nations (PRC's entry in 1971)."8 
However, the good will was short-lived. For one thing, colonial 
legacy also sowed the seeds for discord. The so-called McMahon Line -
a demarcation line drawn on map referred to in the 1914 Simla Accord, 
signed between Britain and Tibet - was to form the boundary between 
British India and Tibet, over which China claimed suzerainty. While 
Britain and Tibet considered the agreement binding, China disputed the 
McMahon Line. India considered the line international boundary. It 
was the root of the thorny and persistent border dispute between India and 
China (to be discussed later). Figures 1 and 2 show the disputed 
Indo-Chin~se borders on the eastern sector (today's Indian state of 
Arunachal Pradesh, formerly North East Frontier Agency) and on the 
western sector (today's Chinese region of Aksai Chin). 
8 Interview with Prof. Phunchok Stobdan, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense Studies 
and Analysis, Delhi , 2 June 2008. 
6 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
Figure 1: China-India Border: Eastern Sector 
Source: http:/ /en. wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China _India_ eastern_ border_ 88.jpg 
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Figure 2: China-India Border: Western Sector 
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In 1950, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet and 
controlled the vast region that had historically served as a buffer (in 
strategic and cultural terms) between India and China. As former Indian 
Army Chief of Staff General Ved P. Malik put it, "The first time we 
(Indians) came into direct contact with Han Chinese was after 1950, when 
the PRC occupied Tibet. We suddenly became neighbors."9 
In 1959, after the failed uprising against the PRC, the Fourteenth 
Dalai Lama, Tibet's highest religious and political leader, fled to India. 
Nehru in 1960 offered Dharamsala as a location for the Government of 
Tibet in Exile. 10 The Tibetan refuge in India became another irritant in 
the bilateral relationship. Ever since then, India's policy on Tibet has 
been a dilemma: On the one hand, India has lent support to Dalai Lama's 
government due to humanitarian and strategic considerations, but has also 
imposed limits on the Tibetan Exile Government's profile and activities. 
On the other hand, the "Tibet card" has served as an obstacle for 
Indo-Chinese relationship. 11 
In 1962 the small skirmishes that were not uncommon along the 
disputed border escalated into open military confrontation. War erupted 
on 20 October 1962 when Chinese troops forcibly evicted Indian troops 
from the Dhola post in the eastern sector. Over the next month the 
9 Interview with General Ved P. Malik, President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer 
Research Foundation, Delhi, 2 June 2008 . 
10 See http://www.tibet.com/. 
11 For an overview oflndia's ambiguous policy toward Tibet, see Sengupta (2008). 
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Chinese troops easily overwhelmed ill-prepared Indian troops in all 
sectors along the McMahon Line. Then on 21 November, the Chinese 
government announced a unilateral withdrawal to points where it 
considered the territorial boundaries to be. Although the war did not 
change the status quo of the border, India essentially had lost the war, 
suffering territorial loss and national humiliation (Sidhu and Yuan 2003: 
15). Ever since then, the 1962 war has cast a long shadow over the 
Indo-Chinese relationship, and India's defeat has colored Indians' 
perceptions of China. 
The worsenmg Indo-Chinese relations became entangled in the 
regional alignment during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union and India 
on one side, and China and Pakistan (and later the U.S.) on the other. 
China's successful nuclear tests in 1964 deepened Indian apprehensions. 
If the 1962 war taught India the importance of indigenous conventional 
deterrence, India's nuclear tests ten years later in 1974 sought to respond 
to China's nuclear capabilities. From 1962 to 1976 China and India 
were mired in a tense cold war. It was not until 1976 that the two 
countries again exchanged ambassadors. 
History clearly cast a long shadow on Indo-Chinese relations. 
Geography 
Historically China and India each had its own geographic orientation: 
China toward East Asia, and India toward South Asia. But modem Tibet 
10 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
after China's entry in 1950 connected these two spheres. The 
development of missile technologies, made possible by the two countries' 
economic growth, had the effect of "shrinking the strategic chessboard" 
(Bracken 1999). 
In recent years, China expanded its influence in the Central and 
Southwest Asian areas by its organizing and promoting the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SC0). 12 Meanwhile, India pursued a Look 
East policy by strengthening its relationships with countries in East and 
Southeast Asia. Both countries seek to play a greater role in areas 
adjacent to their own, and even farther places. China and India thus 
maneuver on overlapping "strategic spaces." 
Ranjit Gupta, a former Indian envoy to Taiwan and a former 
ambassador to five countries, thinks that China, which casts a long 
shadow over India's foreign policy, has always treated India with hostility, 
adopting a "systematic plan" to hem in India through the support of 
Pakistan, influence in Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh, and military 
activities in Tibet. He argues that historically China has behaved like an 
imperial power, expanding when the empire was strong. Recounting his 
personal experience, Gupta observed how China actively pursued an East 
12 The SCO was founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. All but Uzbekistan were the founders of the 
Shanghai Five, founded in 1996. It currently has four observers: India, Iran, Mongolia, 
and Pakistan. See http://www.sectsco.org/. 
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Summit that excluded the U.S., Australia, and lndia. 13 
the past decade, in an effort to ensure its energy security and shore 
oil supply route (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006), China has pursued a 
of Pearls" strategy by constructing facilities and securing access 
around India (e.g., Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri 
Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Sittwe in Myanmar)(see Figure 3). 
prompts some exaggerated Indians to warn that China is turning the 
Ocean into a "Chinese Lake." 14 In 2009, China dispatched 
_ ,rrn"rPr" to the Gulf of Aden under the pretext of protecting Chinese 
~r"u.i:luL ships from Somali pirates prevalent in that area. The flotilla's 
ll'll'l•.,a~:;"' through the Indian Ocean caused some concerns in India. There 
also a tense standoff involving Indian and Chinese 
13 Interview with Amb. Ranjit Gupta (retired), Delhi, 26 May 2008. Ambassador 
Gupta admitted that his viewpoints on China reflect that of the security community and 
are uncommon among the Indian foreign service. 
14 
"India's ocean is Chinese lake: 'String of pearls' threatens India, available at 
http://www.zimbio.com/President+Mahinda+Rajapakse/articles/185/lndia+ocean+Chine 
se+lake+String+pearls+threaten, accessed 12 February 2009. 
15 
"Indian Navy Dismisses Reports of Submarine 'Forced' to Surface by Chinese ships," 
BBC Monitoring South Asia, 9 February 2009, obtained through Lexis-Nexis . 
12 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
Figure 3: "String of Pearls" 
Source: http :1 /www. marinebuzz.com/2008/0 1/23/ china-garlands-india-with-string-of-pearls/ 
Territorial Disputes 
Among all the tssues separating China and India, the territorial 
disputes arising from the undemarcated border significantly inform 
Indians' perspectives of China. Almost every Indian informant whom I 
met during a field research in 2008 raised the border issue as a major 
obstacle to better Indo-Chinese relationship. They feared the potential 
of a flare-up still exists.16 
16 Interview with Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retired), Director, Center for Land 
Warfare Studies, Delhi, 3 June 2008; interview with Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Senior 
Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, 28 May 2008. 
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As mentioned earlier, the border disputes can be traced back to the 
McMahon Line. After the 1962 war, the two sides largely observed the 
line of Actual Control (LAC) in the eastern sector and the Line of 
Control (LOC) in the western sector. The results are that China claims 
the Indian-controlled Arunachal . Pradesh, and India claims the 
Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin. The Chinese claim is partially based on 
fl'awang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. The Chinese argue 
rrawang is a Tibetan territory, and Tibet is part of China. Therefore, the 
entire Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. 
India claims Aksai Chin, which connects Tibet and China's 
northwestern province Xinjiang, as the eastern-most part of its Jammu 
and Kashmir state. 17 Kashmir itself was partitioned three-way by India, 
Pakistan, and China. 
Occasionally Chinese emphasis of their legal titles deeply offended 
the Indians. Just days before Chinese President Hu Jintao 's state visit to 
India in November 2006, Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Yuxi declared, 
"In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh 
is Chinese territory and Tawang is only one place in it and we are 
17 Historically, Aksai Chin was part of the Himalayan Kingdom of Ladakh. Ladakh 
was annexed from the rul~r, of the local Namgyal dynasty by the Dorgas and the princely 
state of Kashmir in the 191 century. It was subsequently absorbed into British India. 
14 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
claiming all of that. That's our position." 18 In 2007, the Chinese 
Embassy in Delhi decided to emphasize its stance by declining a visa to 
an Indian official from north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh state on the 
grounds that he does not need one as he is a "Chinese citizen."19 
The respective statuses of Tibet and Sikk:im, which India 
incorporated in 1975 as its 22nd state, also add to the complexity.20 
In reality, however, this issue is mainly a placeholder and its impact 
will be "bounded." In recent years, the two sides set up working groups 
to deal with the border issue and try to resolve it peacefully. The two sides 
have also done a better job of "compartmentalizing" this issue from 
overall improvement ofbilateral relationship.21 As an American diplomat 
aptly put, "The border issue is unlikely to be a serious problem in the 
relationship, because both sides benefit from this 'festering' that allows 
18 Randeep Ramesh, "International: Himalayan Dispute: Beijing Insists on Claim to 
Territory in Runup to President Hu's Visit to Delhi: Last Vestige of Old Tibetan Culture 
Clings on in Remote Indian State," The Guardian (20 November 2006): 23 . Obtained 
through Lexi-Nexis. 
19 Ravi Velloor, "China Reaffirms Its Claim to Disputed State; No Visa for Indian 
Official from Arunachal as He Is a 'Chinese Citizen,"' The Straits Times (28 May 2007). 
Obtained through Lexis-Nexis. 
20 In 2000, the seventeenth Karmapa Urgyen Trinley Dorje, who had been proclaimed a 
Lama by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim. 
Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue, as any protests to India would mean 
an explicit endorsement of India's governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still 
regarded as an independent state occupied by India. China eventually recognized 
Sikkim as an Indian state in 2003, on the condition that India accepted Tibet as a part of 
China. This mutual recognition led to a thaw in Sino-Indian relations. 
21 Interviews with Sibi Goerge, Political Counselor, and S.D. Sharma, Head of Chancery, 
Embassy of India, Washington, DC, 9 May 2008. 
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them to iustifv more military spending and certain postures."22 
Mutual Threat Perception and Triangular Strategic Relationships 
Indo-Chinese relationship exhibits characteristics of a security 
'lemma:23 the mutual fear and mistrust between them lead each nation to 
e measures to increase its own security. By doing so, it threatens the 
ther nation, causing that nation to respond. The result is more 
ecurity. 
As Table 1 shows, both countries have · substantial military 
Over time, each has deployed certain weapons against the 
er. As mentioned before, India's 1974 nuclear tests were spurred by 
· a's successful tests in 1964. India, under BJP, in 1998 again 
India's defense secretary George Fernandes 
cifically rationalized India's actions on the threats India felt from a 
· ing China and closer Sino-Pakistani alliance.24 
Interview with Joel Ehrendreich, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Delhi, 4 June 2008. 
For a new theoretical discussion on this crucial concept in international relations, see 
and Wheeler (2008). 
"""""""" Minister Calls China 'Potential Threat Number One,'" PTI News Agency, 
· 3 May 1998 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1998). Obtained 
Lexis-Nexis. 
16 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
Table 3 
China vs. India: Rise of Two Asian Giants 
l ndlc•tor (Unit), infomwtion as of 2006 
G ross Domestic Product (With PPP) (S bn) 
GOP Real Growth Rate(% ) 
Gross Domestic Product (constant) (S bn) 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (with PPP) ($) 
Expons (S bn) 
lmpons (S bn) 
Main cxpon panncrs (text) 
Main impon panners (text) 
Foreign direct investment (S bn) 
Population (pop m) 
Armed Forcea (number) 
Main Banle Tanks ( number) 
Artillery (number) 
Surfaee Combatant Vessels (number) 
Submarines (number) 
Aircraft Carrien (number) 
Combat Aircraft (number) 
Attack Helicopters (number) 
Nuclear weapons status (text) 
I 
Cbemical weapons status (text) 
Biological weapons status (text) 
Shon-rangc ballistic missile status (text) 
Medium-range ballistic missile status (text) 
Intermediate-range ball istic miss ile status (text) 
Submarine-launched ballistic missile status (text) 
Intercontinental ballistic missile status (text) 
Strategic bomber status (text) 
Strategic submarine: status (text) 
WMD Commitments (text) 
Foreign exchange reserves <• bn) 
Sources: NBR. Stmteglc A.•ia data query 
1
: World Bank • WDI 
NBR Research Team 
I' 
,: 
IMF - IFS 
nss Military Balance 
C IA World Factbook 
I
t Census Bureau 
_: A~tional info~Lion . ~vailablc 
C h ina l ndta 
10.000' 4.042' 
1o .s • s.s• 
2.095.9' 703.3' 
7.600 · 3.700' 
974. 112. 
777.9" 187.9" 
US (21.4% ). Hong Kong US ( 16.7%), UAE (8.S%). 
(16.3%), Japan ( I I%)'• C hina (6.6% )•• 
Japan ( I 5.2%), South China (7.3%). US 
Korea (11.6%), Taiwan (5.6%)'• 
( 11.2%)'• 
78. 1' 11 .s• 
1,3 14.0 1. 11 1.7 
2.255,000"0 1.3 16.000" 0 
7,S80" 3,978" 
17,600" 3.640" 
76" 58" 
ss• 16" 
0" I" 
3.435 883 
3 1" 60" 
Confirmed" Confi rmed 
Probable" Confirmed" 
Suspected" Unknown" 
Confirmed"• ConHrmed • 
ConHrmed • ConHrmcd • 
None None 
Confirmed"• None 
ConHrmed"• None 
None" None 
ConHrmed" None 
BTWC. CWC, NPT"• BTWC.CWC"• 
1,0 1111.3"4 170 .11f 
' 
I 
I 
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China has always loomed large on India's defense and foreign 
The 1962 war, the border dispute, the complex menages a trois 
China-India-U.S. and China-India-Pakistan, and each nation's 
itions all play a role, causing each side to suspect the true intentions 
Some Indians viewed the SCO and the String 
1 . h 25 ear s wtt concerns. India was especially concerned about China's 
· ·tary assistance to Pakistan, which allows the latter to act as a proxy to 
eigh down" India. 
A hard-nosed Indian analyst asserts, "China and India are natural 
Is in Asia for geostrategic, economic, and ideological (democracy vs. 
racy) reasons. In every aspect, we are contrasts. Our interests 
h. We also compete for the same resources in Africa. Such rivalry 
not easily reconcilable."26 Many Indians feel that a rising China may 
e it harder for India to ascend. 27 
nomic Partnership and Rivalry 
In many aspects, China's economic data are more impressive than 
· 's (see Table 1 ): China has achieved higher growth rates, higher 
me level, larger economy, greater trade volume, and has attracted 
foreign investment. But in many ways their economies are also 
......... ,;.,. . .,with Narendra Kumar Tripalhi, United Service Institution oflndia, Delhi, 2 
with Bharat Kamad, Research Professor, National Security Studies, Center 
Re!>eaJ:ch. Delhi, 4 June 2008 . 
....... "'"''"" esh Rajagopalan, Professor in International Politics, Jawaharlal 
·, 27 May 2008, and Nandan Unnikrishnan, Director, Eurasian 
Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, 28 May 2008. 
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complementary. China's success is mainly based on becoming the 
manufacturing base of foreign multinationals with global sales network, 
whereas India's is more domestically oriented, focusing on engineering 
and service. 28 China's hardware proficiency can complement India's 
software prowess. Some Indians and (fewer) Chinese envision the two 
nations merging into a giant "Chindia" - a formidable economic 
partnership with the world's largest populations and complementary 
economic strengths (Engardio 2007). 
Yet their two economies also compete, particularly over energy 
sources for each nation's economic development. While many in the 
Indian community see an economically rising China as an opportunity 
(for Indian products or services, for business alliance possibilities), more 
see it as a threat. During my field trip to Mumbai and Delhi in 
May-June 2008, I sought to study the impact of Chinese products on 
Indian companies and consumers by direct observation and elite interview. 
Indian companies that exclusively serviced the domestic market often 
complained about the inexpensive Chinese goods flooding the Indian 
market. Consumers were more ambivalent: While they generally liked 
the low-cost Chinese goods, they were also concerned about food and 
product safety, as well as the quality of the goods. Indian companies 
that sell to international markets invariably faced the strong competition 
from their Chinese counterparts. Some executives wondered the 
incredibly low prices of the Chinese products, which undermined the 
28 See Huang and Khanna (2003) and Engardio (2007). 
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compames, could only result from the Chinese government's 
In this regard, India's experience is not too much different from 
ose of other countries with backlash against cheap and unsafe Chinese 
Such a multifaceted relationship results from many complex causes 
inting toward different directions, as analyzed above. To 
conceptualize this relationship and to speculate its future, three paradigms 
PARADIGMS 
opolitics 
As soon as India and China came into direct contact through the 
Tibet nexus, geography has conditioned their relations. China and India 
are neighbors. The Chinese have a saying, "A distant relative is less 
useful than a proximate neighbor." Friends can change, but neighbors 
can't. "You can't change geography," says an Indian think tank 
analyst.31 So the logic goes, India must get along with China. Indeed, 
various Indian leaders have made this a priority, although many Indians 
feel that India's goodwill is not reciprocated. A third neighbor -
29 Interviews with Anil Tiwari, Shree Krishna Engineering Works, Mumbai, 24 May 
2008; Bhavin Shah, Alkon Plastics Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, 24 May 2008; Prayag Thakkar, 
Mutual Industries, Mumbai, 24 May 2008; Vinay Sawar, Teryai Equipment, Mumbai, 24 
May 2008. 
30 The following section benefits from Prof. Tan Chung's lecture, 20 May 2008. 
31 Interview with Nandan Unnikrishnan. 
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Pakistan - further complicates the relationship between these two 
neighbors. 
As discussed before, these two Asian giants' strategic spaces overlap 
and they both have ambitions to become a major regional, if not world, 
power. The Chinese have a saying, "The same mountain cannot 
accommodate two tigers." From the Indian's perspectives, India cannot 
accept Chinese hegemony. A rising China makes India's ascent more 
difficult, if not impossible. It can also explain why the Indians felt 
compelled to sign a landmark nuclear agreement with the U.S. 
In the geopolitics paradigm, the logic of balance of power prevails. 
Competition, mutual suspicion, alliance, and military buildup - standard 
tenets of realism - have heavily conditioned Indo-Chinese relations. 
Power is important in this paradigm. Tan Chung depicts power politics 
as horizontal expansion, which leads to border disputes. As stated, 
historically China and India did not have border disputes. China did not 
occupy Tibet until 1950. Modem concepts of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity have ensnarled both China and India. 
Viewing Indo-Chinese relations through the geopolitics paradigm 
will have a negative impact on the relationship. Many of my informants 
seemed to accept certain basic realist premises and their arguments 
confirmed the geopolitics paradigm. 
Indian Perspectives on the Rise of China 21 
oeconomics 
Yet at the same time, China and India are both rising economically. 
And there exists complementarity between their economies. In the 
paradigm, the logic is interconnectivity and mutual 
ependence. This creates space (complementarity) and turns the 
ero-sum competition in the first paradigm into a win-win situation. An 
increasing number of books (Engardio 2007, Khanna 2007, Meredith 
2007) champion this prospect: China's hardware combining with India's 
software; China's yang blending with India's yin. Judging from the 
relatively still moderate trade volume between the two ($40 billion per 
year) and the fact that neither is a key trading partner to the other, there 
exists immense potential for a closer economic partnership to gradually 
emerge, which would help ameliorate the overall bilateral relationship. 
However, the emergence of a "Chindia" requires a leap of faith that 
is not supported by evidence. While several of my informants thought 
Chindia was a good idea, almost nobody predicted it would happen. 
Geocivilizations 
The third paradigm is not the mainstay of western international 
relations theories. It is reflectivist, rather than rationalist. Its logic is 
affinity, rather than material interests. 
Economic historian Angus Maddison opined that in the past one 
thousand years, China's population had constituted 1/3 to 116 of the 
22 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
world's population, and India's population had sometimes been larger 
than China's. Tan Chung opined that this meant that these two countries 
were most hospitable. He described the two's relationship as "made in 
heaven." With population congregating, wealth was created. With 
their shared origins in the Himalayas, Ganges and Indus gave rise to the 
Indian Civilization and Yellow and Yangtze gave rise to the Chinese 
Civilization. 
As Sen pointed out, before the advent of modem history, there was a 
lot of mutual admiration between China and India. In the twentieth 
century, the two also shared Asian pride and anti-colonial solidarity. 
Their mutual suspicion and antipathy was a more recent phenomenon. 
Mao Zedong in his lifetime only visited two "countries": the Soviet 
Union and the Indian Embassy. Nehru, whose affection for China was 
legendary, was welcomed by 500,000 people when he visited China. 
Every Chinese believe when they die, they "return to the west" (India). 
Buddhism originated in India but flourished in China. One Indian 
scholar hailing from Ladakh summarized his visits to China this way, 
"People conjure up India as 'the land of the Buddha,' or land of 
poverty."32 Although some Indians rightly feel that Chinese may have 
behaved in a condescending or overbearing way toward the Indians, 
China's current advantage is not preordained or can be expected to last 
32 Interview with Phunchok Stobdan. 
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forever. 
This paradigm will call for a total reconceptualization of the 
Indo-Chinese relationship. It may be far-fetched to think of an 
Indo-Chinese partnership that is as cordial or close as the U.S.-United 
Kingdom bond. But appreciating each other's civilizational 
attractiveness can form a deeper and more enduring bond that is currently 
missing in the Indo-Chinese relationship. 
WHITHER? 
What would the future hold for Indo-Chinese relations? Largely 
speaking there are three scenarios. The first is continued, perhaps even 
heightened, rivalry. - guided by the logic of the geopolitics paradigm. 
Indications of this are not difficult to find. China figures prominently in 
Indian defense planning. China's growing military and economic power 
may deeply unsettle India. With newly accumulated wealth from almost 
two decades of fast growth, India may devote greater resources into the 
military. It will become more aligned with the U.S.- in a reversal of its 
stance during the Cold War. The U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement 
~itomized this trend. China may enhance its support of Pakistan and 
increase its influence in the South Asian continent, the Indian Ocean, and 
Southwest Asia. 
The second possibility is "Chindia" -- driven by the logic of the 
geoeconomics paradigm -- to jointly promote a multipolar world and a 
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more equitable global order (e.g., reforming the United Nations). 
However, an Indo-Chinese entente aimed at the U.S. is unlikely, as each 
derives many benefits by maintaining a good relationship with the U.S. 
The third possibility is pragmatic management of their relationship, 
seeking solutions to their unresolved disputes while exploring areas of 
cooperation. Compared to the hot war of 1962 and the cold war that 
ensued, Indo-Chinese relationship has shown promise of normalization. 
However, irritants still exist. The two sides should not be satisfied with 
prolonged but indecisive talks on settling the border issue. The Chinese 
had border disputes with just about every one of its land neighbors. For 
long periods of time, the China typically remained stuck in principled 
positions without any real progress, but it had shown in a number of cases 
that it could make concessions and conclude an agreement. 33 Both 
China and India need to show greater political will in order to settle the 
border dispute (one example would be mutual recognition of each other's 
actual control). Other confidence-building measures, such as greater 
Chinese sensitivity to Indian concerns about China's support of Pakistan 
and greater transparency and better communication to prevent accidents 
or misperceptions, would help. For a truly solid relationship, the two 
will benefit from the insights of the geocivilization paradigm. 
China and India are two large developing countries, both making 
33 
"Russia and China Settle Eastern-Border Dispute," The International Herald Tribune 
(22 July 2008): 3. 
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remarkable transformation. Their choices, including interpreting the 
other's intentions, will importantly shape our future world. Just like 
Alexander Wendt (1992) cogently said, "Anarchy is what states make of 
it." The future of Indo-Chinese relationship is not condemned to rivalry 
and hospitality; nor will a "Chindia naturally result, just because it 
"makes sense." To return to the constructivist's axiom, it depends on the 
evolving structure of elite identities and preferences, informed by the 
three paradigms and socialized through interactions. 
26 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
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